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Introduction 
In June 2003 an UNCLOS tribunal constituted under the auspices of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration rendered a procedural order that has since entered the number of international 
decisions to be studied in a modern international law course. This was not the only decision in 
the broader dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom concerning the operation of the 
nuclear reprocessing plant in Sellafield (in fact, the dispute yielded a grand total of four) nor 
was it the one that settled it. Rather, its importance lies in the way the tribunal—one of 
illustrious composition—decided to manage a potential conflict with other international 
jurisdictions. Faced with the prospect of an almost certain involvement of the European Court 
of Justice, the tribunal opted to suspend its proceedings.1  
Let us keep the tape rolling as we fast-forward a decade. In 2013, an ICSID arbitral 
tribunal observed that, while not bound, in principle, by any rule of precedent, ‘it should have 
regard to earlier decisions of courts (particularly the ICJ) and of other international dispute 
tribunals engaged in the interpretation of the terms of a BIT’.2 And the next year, another 
example: faced with the problem of parallel proceedings on the same dispute pending before 
the domestic courts of the respondent state, an investment tribunal observed that it had ‘a 
                                                
1 MOX Plant Case Ireland v. United Kingdom (‘MOX Plant Case’) (Order No 3) (UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal, 
PCA). 
2 Tulip Real Estate and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, 
Decision on Bifurcated Jurisdictional Issue, 5 March 2013. 
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measure of discretion with respect to the timing and conduct of the arbitration and that 
municipal judicial proceedings may sometimes need to be taken into account’.3 
What the cases (and the list could be extended quite at length) have in common is not 
the originating regime, the factual matrix at issue, or the legal problem in question, but rather 
the reliance on a specific, if multifaceted, principle: comity. In most legal systems, the word is 
looked at with some suspicion, as there seems to be no end to the debate on its meaning. In the 
field of international law, the problem is even greater, as to talk of a principle of ‘comity’ is to 
talk of a principle that does not satisfy the legality threshold. Yet, this is a concept that can lay 
claim to a long history, and stubbornly refuses to go away: with some generalisations, the 
traditional definition of comity may be that of a principle in the name of which courts would 
fine-tune the reach of their national substantive law and jurisdictional rules, refrain from 
questioning the lawfulness of another sovereign state’s acts, and restrict themselves from 
issuing such judgments and orders when to do so would have amounted to an unjustifiable 
interference. Whatever one thinks of it, comity is widely referred to in the case law of domestic 
courts. And of more immediate relevance for our purposes, there are indications that it may be 
resurfacing in the context of international adjudication. While it was never really a stranger in 
their chambers, its recent rediscovery by international courts and tribunals can be better 
explained against the background of the proliferation of judicial and arbitral institutions and the 
interactions deriving therefrom.  
                                                
3 PCA, British Caribbean Bank Limited v. The Government of Belize - Award, 19 Dember 2014, PCA Case No 
2010-18 para. 187. 
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International law, to go along with an oft-cited decision, ‘lacks a centralised structure’, 
and ‘does not provide for an integrated judicial system operating an orderly division of labour 
among a number of tribunals’.4 Given the number and diversity of international judicial bodies, 
it is hardly surprising that those who adopted expressions such as ‘the international judiciary’ 
only did so at the price of far-reaching caveats or inverted commas.5 Jurisdictional competition 
need not necessarily be considered disadvantageous, but it inevitably brings to the table the 
possibility of parallel proceedings, diverging interpretations of the same rule, instances of forum 
shopping, as well as the risk of conflicting decisions.6 Conflicts of legal regimes probably 
cannot be dealt with in a fashion that is entirely satisfactory with the currently available rules. 
Doubts in fact remain as to whether any rules at all could succeed in the task. For this reason, 
comity, which is a creature subtler than rules, may well appear as a readily available cure for 
some of these systemic problems.7 
                                                
4 Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, 
(Oct. 2, 1995), (1996) 35 ILM 32, 39. See also J. Pauwelyn and L.E. Salles, ‘Forum Shopping Before International 
Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions’, 42 Cornell International Law Journal (2009) 77, at 84. 
5 See, inter alia, Chester Brown, The Evolution and Application of Rules Concerning Independence of the“ 
International Judiciary,” 2 LAW PRACT. INT. COURTS TRIB. 63–96 (2003); Cesare P. R. Romano, The Proliferation 
of International Judicial Bodies: The Piece of the Puzzle’(1999), 31 N. Y. UNIV. J. INT. LAW POLIT. 709. 
6 See CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 15 (2007); YUVAL SHANY, THE 
COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 74 (2003). 
7 Similarity in the Eye of the Beholder: Revisiting the Application of Rules Governing Jurisdictional Conflicts in 
the Lauder / CMS Cases, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE 
FORDHAM PAPERS 2007 119, 135 (Arthur W. Rovine & Yuval Shany eds., 2008). 
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The question we want to address, then, is this: what exactly is the place of comity in 
modern public international law adjudication? To do so, the present study moves in three parts: 
Part 1 deals with the concept of comity in private and public international law, briefly 
considering its development and its modern understanding. In Part 2, we shift our focus to 
international dispute settlement and seek to identify the problems for which the use of comity 
has been proposed and we engage with the current scholarly debate on the matter. In Part 3 we 
discuss all the publicly available decisions by international courts and tribunals using the term 
‘comity’ and classify them before finally pulling the threads together.8  
1. The concept of comity 
A celebrated international law textbook quipped that comity is ‘a wonderful word to use when 
one wants to blur the distinction between public and private international law, or to avoid clarity 
of thought’. 9 There are two pieces of conventional wisdom here. The first is that, indeed, private 
and public international lawyers, with some remarkable exceptions, seem to agree that the 
                                                
8 This covers all decisions issued by dispute settlement mechanisms in disputes with at least one state party where 
there is some discussion of what comity is. Accordingly, we have included cases where mentions of the principle 
were meaningful, albeit brief, and excluded decisions which, while containing the word ‘comity’, clearly and 
unambiguously addressed entirely different issues. Consideration was also given to the issue of ‘false positives’: 
this is the case, for example, of expressions such as ‘the comity of the majority’ and citations of excerpts from 
other judgments lacking further discussion, but also of decisions referring to unrelated concepts such as ‘positive 
comity’: see, for example, Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of 
Their Competition Laws, June 4, 1998, US-EC, 37 ILM 1070 (1998). 
9 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (2002). 
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concept of comity is not to be understood as terribly helpful. We will try, throughout this article, 
to show that the helpfulness of comity may well depend on well we understand it. The second 
is that private and public international law understandings of comity need to be distinguished. 
In attempts to investigate what comity means, it is indeed problematic to dispense with this 
distinction. It leads us, for instance, to try to find a common denominator for comity in private 
and in public international law. This common denominator, according to Cheatham, is the idea 
that ‘the relation or the action in question is governed by considerations other than compulsion 
or legal duty’.10  Not much understanding is gained this way. Along the same line of thought, 
if we focus on the etymological origins of the word, we end up in a similar place. Consider: the 
word ‘comity’ derives from the Latin noun comitas, meaning ‘courtesy’, ‘friendliness’, and 
‘civility’, but also ‘humanity’.11 In the English language, the term indicates courtesy and 
considerate behaviour towards others12, or ‘a loose widespread community based on common 
social institutions’.13 
In this Part, then, we will examine what comity means in public and in private 
international law separately. This does mean, however, that the concept in one field cannot be 
                                                
10 Elliott E. Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility,  HARV. LAW REV. 361–
394, 374 (1945). 
11 Definition of ‘comitas’ in A LATIN DICTIONARY (C.T. Lewis & C. Short eds, 1879); definition of ‘comitas’ in 
K.E. Georges & F. Calonghi (eds), GEORGES: DIZIONARIO ENCICLOPEDICO LATINO-ITALIANO. 
12 Definition of ‘comity’, Oxford Dictionaries online,  
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/comity (last visited 18 January 2016). 
13 ‘Definition of Comity’, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available online at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/comity (last visited 30 October 2016). 
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conveniently used in the other, as we will argue throughout this article. Before we do this, 
however, we should recall that it is not too hard to find cases where comity was employed as a 
shorthand for public international law or the entire field of conflict of law. But it is for a more 
specific meaning that we are looking. 
A. Comity and public international law 
In traditional public international law scholarship, the term ‘comity’ traditionally designates, 
first and foremost, those acts performed—by states and towards states only—for reasons other 
than the belief that there is a binding legal norm mandating them. Accordingly, it is customary 
to focus on them to explain what international law is not.14 
The non-bindingness of the rules of international comity is clearly not disputed, but to 
conclude that they have no normative value whatsoever would be a non sequitur. Bindingness 
and normativity are two different things. As Hedley Bull pointed out, order in social life, 
broadly understood, is very closely connected with the conformity of behaviour to (normative) 
rules of conduct, though not necessarily to (binding) rules of law.15 This is surely the case of 
rules of comity, which too arise from repetition of conduct—conduct which, however, is carried 
                                                
14 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (8 edition ed. 2012); LASSA 
OPPENHEIM, ROBERT YEWDALL JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (9th ed. 
2008); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2014); Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law,  
in INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 99 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2014). 
15 HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 6 (2002). 
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out in the belief that is not mandated by a rule of international law.16 In the real world, rules of 
comity are routinely complied with. This may result, as Hersch Lauterpacht put it, in a rule of 
comity ‘acquiring the complexion’ of rules of customary international law.17 In other words, 
comity is not a source of international law, but it may be, and has been, the basis and 
justification for the emergence of rules of international law.18 Questions of immunity, for 
instance, largely fall into this category.19 Where comity constitutes the basis of a rule of 
                                                
16 For a helpful discussion of comity and custom see Gerald J. Postema, Custom in international law: a normative 
practice account,  in THE NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW , 285 (James B Murphy & Amanda Perreau-Saussine eds., 
2007). 
17 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT. VOL 
1: GENERAL WORKS. 43–4 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970); CRAWFORD, supra note 14 at 24. It should be pointed 
out that the reverse may also occur, so that rules of international law may lose their legal nature and be demoted 
to rules of comity. One usual example is the practice of greeting foreign warships: Jörn Kämmerer, COMITY MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW § 7 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2006), 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/epil. 
18 LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 Peace INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 25 (1905). (‘But there can be no doubt that many 
a rule which formerly was a rule of International Comity only is nowadays a rule of International Law. And it is 
certainly to be expected that this development will go on in future also, and that thereby many a rule of present 
International Comity will in future become one of International Law.’) The passage is reproduced without 
substantial changes in OPPENHEIM, JENNINGS, AND WATTS, supra note 14 at 51. 
19 The Exchange v. McFaddon 11 U.S. 116 (1812); Hazel Fox, International Law and Restraints on the Exercise 
of Jurisdiction by National Courts of States,  in INTERNATIONAL LAW , 856 (Malcolm Evans ed., 2010); Jasper 
Finke, Sovereign Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?, 21 EUR. J. INT. LAW 853–881 (2010). It must be 
pointed out that there exist, in this area, references to comity that blur the distinction. According to Collins, for 
example, ‘[i]t is no doubt in the sense of binding rules of public international law that the expression is used’ with 
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international law, the question may arise of what significance, if any, this origin should have. 
In any event, while it has been argued that reading a rule of international law with comity in 
mind could, for example, ‘determine what is required by good faith, which takes into account 
reliability based on tradition and expectations of courtesy’.20 Reliance on the principle is, in any 
event, limited to elucidating the meaning and purpose of the rule itself.21  
B. Comity in private international law 
1. Background 
The history of the notion of comity in private international law is very much a history of the 
concept of sovereignty.22 With the development of the Westphalian system, territorial 
                                                
reference to immunity: Laurence Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law,  in REFORM AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH , 96–7 (James Fawcett 
ed., 2002). 
20 Kämmerer, supra note 17 at § 8. 
21 See for example Cudak v. Lithuania, App. No. 15869/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 23, 2010): ‘The Court must first 
examine whether the limitation pursued a legitimate aim. In this connection, it observes that State immunity was 
developed in international law out of the principle par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State 
could not be subject to the jurisdiction of another. The Court considers that the grant of immunity to a State in civil 
proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good relations 
between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty’. The matter will be further investigated infra 
Part IV. 
22 KURT LIPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 16 (1981); Thomas 
Schultz & David Holloway, Retour sur la comity, deuxième partie: La comity dans l’histoire du droit international 
privé,  J. DROIT INT. 571–595, 573 (2012). 
COMITY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
sovereignty and freedom from interference were consecrated as the essential pillars of the new 
world order, and a system of territorial law replaced the old personal statutes. Still, the 
transnational commercial relations that flourished on the European continent were not ready for 
such rigidity.23 Accordingly, comity was developed as a doctrine intended to mitigate the ill-
effects of strict territoriality.24 The doctrine was developed in the Netherlands by scholars 
seeking to answer the specific problem of which law should govern a specific legal 
relationship.25 In its most celebrated formulation, by Ulrich Huber, the doctrine provided an 
elegant solution based on three axioms, the first two reaffirming the principle of territorial 
sovereignty, and the third postulating that state authorities could have applied foreign laws to 
govern private interactions, ‘insofar as they do not prejudice the powers or rights’ of the state 
concerned.26 
There is no genuine consensus as to the issue of whether the third axiom was meant to 
grant absolute discretion to the national authorities of one nation or was, on the contrary, a 
simple description of the current practices.27 Huber’s understanding of international law was 
                                                
23 RODOLFO DE NOVA, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION TO CONFLICT OF LAWS 441 (1966); Harold 
G. Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or There and Back Again, 25 VA J INTL L 7, 10 (1984). 
24 CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150 (2008). 
25 PAULUS VOET, DE STATUTIS EORUMQUE CONCURSU LIBER SINGULARIS (1661); JOHANNES VOET, 
COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS. (1698). 
26 This translation appears in Ernest Gustav Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum,  in SELECTED ARTICLES ON 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947). See also the text in Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of 
Laws: One Hundred Years after,  HARV. LAW REV. 15–38, 403 (1934); Joel R. Paul, Comity in international law, 
32 HARV. INT. LAW J. 1 (1991).  
27 DE NOVA, supra note 23 at 449. 
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fundamentally Grotian, and it is not inconceivable that his intention might have been to qualify 
the rule as an international usage—if not as a custom proper. It was comity’s discretionary 
component, however, that had the most significant impact, especially in the common law world. 
Lord Mansfield in England and Joseph Story in the United States realised the significance of 
the concept, and the latter in particular granted widespread recognition to Huber’s views—
though, according to some, he did so at the cost of some inaccuracies.28 A United States 
Supreme Court Justice, Story did not see comity as amounting to anything more than a rather 
imperfect obligation, arising ‘from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the 
inconveniences which would result from a contrary doctrine”.29 The Supreme Court later 
produced what still is the most influential statement of the doctrine. In Hilton v Guyot, a 
decision of immeasurable influence, Justice Gray defined it as ‘neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other’.30 Comity was 
in fact, Justice Gray continued, ‘the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to 
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other under the 
protection of its laws’.31 
                                                
28 ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 27–44 (1992). 
29 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC: IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, 
RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND 
JUDGMENTS (1834)§ 33; Story quotes SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE 
FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS 28 (1828). 
30 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64.  
31 Ibid. 
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2.  Current uses of comity 
With the unfolding of the positivist revolution, comity ceased to be considered a suitable basis 
for private international law. Yet, as Lawrence Collins noted in 2002, the use of the term by the 
judiciary remains extensive, regardless how much it is frowned upon in textbooks.32 In its 
modern incarnation, the ‘doctrine of comity’ requires courts to place trust in and not interfere 
with foreign courts, as well as to give ‘full faith and credit to, or [respect] the conclusiveness 
of, the acts of foreign institutions’; at the same time, it provides the principles that should guide 
these practices.33 With some approximation, the uses of comity may be classified according to 
a taxonomy proposed by Harold Koh, which distinguishes between legislative (or prescriptive) 
comity, judicial comity, and executive comity.34 The first two concern the application of foreign 
law or the limitation of the reach of local law, as well as the recognition of foreign decisions or 
the use of discretion to limit the jurisdiction of domestic courts. The third, instead, commands 
deference when foreign sovereign interests are at stake and provides a basis for the ‘act of state 
doctrine’—which bars a court from sitting in judgment of the acts that another sovereign state 
                                                
32 Collins, supra note 19; Collins refers in particular to the description of comity as “grating to the ear when it 
proceeds from a court of law” CHESHIRE, NORTH & FAWCETT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, (James Fawcett et 
al. eds., 14th ed. 2008); The phrase is Samuel Livermore’s , supra note 29 at 28. 
33 Adrian Briggs, The Principle of Comity in Private International Law, 354  in RECUEIL DES COURS DE 
L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 65, 91. 
34 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (2008); Donald Earl III 
Childress, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 UC DAVIS LAW REV. 11, 
48 (2010). 
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performs in its territory—and does not necessarily fit well with the other two categories.35 All 
these uses reflect, as Donald Childress puts it, ‘a set of ideas about sovereign-sovereign relations 
that courts can point to and take into account when adjudicating transnational disputes’.36 In the 
day-to-day administration of justice, comity tends, however, to be a simpler matter, and 
operates as a judicial tool in such a way that, in Adrian Briggs’s words, ‘the language of the 
comity of sovereigns… feels out of place’.37 In practice, comity has been invoked as an upper 
limit to restrain the reach of domestic law in cases concerning issues as diverse as competition 
and human rights; it has been considered a relevant factor in the granting of recognition to 
foreign and international judicial decisions, and interpreted as counselling restraint in passing 
judgment on the sovereign acts of other states; further, it has also been considered as a 
compelling reason to refrain from adjudication in case of international litispendence (actual or 
simply foreseen) and a significant parameter for the granting of anti-suit injunctions.38 
 Comity, not entirely unlike equity, operates infra and praeter legem, but never overrides 
a command of the sovereign.39 In practice, while the transnational regulatory web has become 
                                                
35 KOH, supra note 34; On the emergence of executive comity and the act of state doctrine as a way to 
“accommodate respect for foreign sovereignty with growing American intercourse with other nations” see Harold 
Koh, Transnational public law litigation,  YALE LAW J. 2347–2402, 2357 (1991); Childress, supra note 34 at 47.  
36 Childress, supra note 34 at 60. 
37 Briggs, supra note 33 at 89. 
38 On the operation of comity, see Paul, supra note 26; Joel R. Paul, Transformation of International Comity, The, 
71 LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. 19 (2008); Childress, supra note 34; Thomas Schultz & Jason Mitchenson, Navigating 
Sovereignty and Transnational Commercial Law: The Use of Comity by Australian Courts, 12 J. PRIV. INT. LAW 
(2016). 
39 Briggs, supra note 33 at 87. 
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more dense, comity still remains a useful tool in the hands of courts, capable as it is of operating 
as a lubricant or counterbalancing ‘the inadequacy of the normative criteria’ necessary to solve 
jurisdictional conflicts.40 
3.  New understandings of comity  
While sovereignty constitutes the traditional theoretical underpinning of the doctrine, it does 
not follow that it covers the ways in which comity has been used or necessarily matches the 
evolution of its understanding. These changes have occurred through gradual—but radical—
changes in the backdrop of transnational adjudication, so that it has been referenced to justify 
instances of deference to ‘the needs of the international commercial system’41, support 
transnationally consistent interpretations of international instruments (public or private alike)42, 
and, more in general, further the ‘mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning 
international legal regime’.43  
                                                
40 Briggs, supra note 33; ELISA D’ALTERIO, LA FUNZIONE DI REGOLAZIONE DELLE CORTI NELLO SPAZIO 
AMMINISTRATIVO GLOBALE 181 (2011). 
41 For example, giving effect to an arbitration clause that covered antitrust matters, traditionally considered non-
arbitrable, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614, at 615. The decision was 
also cited in ICSID, ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America – Procedural Order No. 2, 9 January 2003, Case 
No ARB(AF)/00/1. 
42 Paul, supra note 38.Schultz and Mitchenson, supra note 38. T. Schultz and N. Ridi, How Comity Makes 
Transnationalism Work, forthcoming.  
43 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 
(1987) at 555. 
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Moreover, comity constitutes a key concept for the understanding of judicial networks. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter has convincingly relied on the notion to explain certain dynamics.44 In 
her view, comity constitutes one of the building blocks of judicial dialogue occurring in the 
‘global community’ of national and international courts, offering ‘the framework and the 
ground rules for a global dialogue among judges in the context of specific cases’.45 According 
to her model, courts would respect foreign courts ‘qua courts, rather than simply as the face of 
a foreign government’, recognizing them as co-equals in the global task of judging’, though 
with a distinctive emphasis on individual rights and the judicial role in protecting them.  
To be sure, Slaughter’s theory is not without its critics and it has been suggested that it 
is, to a large extent, quite starry-eyed.46 Yet, it has the merit of emphasising the role of judges 
and arbitrators—national and international—as facilitators of the coordination of legal regimes. 
In this guise, comity is a primary rule of conduct addressed to judges and arbitrators, asking 
them to balance some of the variegated interests implied in making one legal regime prevail 
over another in a specific instance. Such a theory of comity underscores the importance of 
                                                
44 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial globalization, 40 VA J INTL L 1103 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global 
Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT. LAW J. 191 (2003); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 
(2004). 
45 SLAUGHTER, supra note 44 at 87. 
46 See Alex Mills & Tim Stephens, Challenging the Role of Judges in Slaughter’s Liberal Theory of International 
Law, 18 LEIDEN J. INT. LAW 1–30 (2005). 
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balancing efforts, and is hardly ‘arbitrary and dangerous’ as the traditional critique has often 
suggested.47 
C. Comity: a summary 
One problem with most of the scholarship on comity is that it almost invariably defines the 
concept in the negative or indirectly. For the sake of clarity and the discussion that follows, but 
without any claim of exhaustiveness, we attempt to offer a positive, working definition. We 
understand comity as a judicial tool which, pursuant to an accepted paradigm on the allocation 
of regulatory authority (such as sovereignty), directs courts to engage in acts of restraint or 
recognition. This concretely translates into the following actions taken by courts: fine-tuning 
the reach of domestic substantive law; resorting to discretionary abstention in case of actual or 
foreseen jurisdictional conflicts; granting respect and recognition to the judgments of their 
foreign counterparts or presuming that foreign law and acts are valid; or otherwise respecting 
an expression of coequal authority that does not infringe its external limits. By extension, the 
term ‘comity’ also designates the rationale for the set of judicial tools and techniques developed 
to achieve these goals.  
This understanding of comity essentially originates in private international law. But as 
we will try to show, it can also helpfully be used – and actually is helpfully used - in public 
international law. This is particularly so in international adjudication, to which we now turn. 
                                                
47 T.H. HEALY, Théorie générale de l'ordre public, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International Vol. 9 
(1925) 411, 433; Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO LJ 53, 70 (1991). 
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2. The potential of comity in international adjudication 
Comity, as we have already mentioned, is routinely used in domestic adjudication, and not at 
all unheard of in international fora. Its re-emergence, however, is linked to a specific 
phenomenon: the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. In this context, the concept 
of comity may have the potential to solve, or at least mitigate, some of the problems arising 
from a disorderly multiplication of competing authorities.  
A. Proliferation and its implications 
The multiplication of international judicial institutions has probably been one of the most 
significant developments to ever occur in the international legal system. Its causes have been 
identified, on the one hand, in the increased willingness of states to submit to international 
adjudication and, on the other hand, in the inevitable specialisation of certain fields.48 A 
burgeoning and spread of international courts and tribunals resulted, differing in their mandates, 
the rules they have to apply, the status of the parties to the disputes they are called to resolve, 
and the very inclusiveness of their jurisdictions, which tend to grow more inclusive and difficult 
to elude as international adjudication moves from a consensual to a compulsory paradigm.49 
Proliferation is a divisive topic. For some, numerous and diverse set of judicial institutions may 
better serve the interest of justice, efficiency, and party autonomy, with different approaches to 
                                                
48 BROWN, supra note 6; Geir Ulfstein, International Courts and Judges: Independence, Interaction, and 
Legitimacy,  NYU J. INT. LAW POLIT. 2014 14–13, 22 (2014). 
49 Cesare P. R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in International Adjudication: 
Elements for a Theory of Consent, The, 39 N. Y. UNIV. J. INT. LAW POLIT. 791, 795 (2006). 
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the same matters ultimately sparking legal development.50 Others contend that it is reason for 
concern, both for the parties to the dispute and the international legal system as a whole. If the 
problem is seen through this lens, the value of comity comes quite naturally into focus. With 
more international courts comes a greater risk of parallel proceedings, instances of forum 
shopping, conflicting decisions, and diverging interpretations of the same rules of law that may 
bring about ‘fragmentation’ issues as a consequence of the move towards specialisation.51 
Conflicts may occur between international courts and tribunals and their counterparts, but can 
also easily involve national courts. There exists ample room for inter-systemic and infra-
systemic conflicts, which have further complicated the resolution of certain disputes and 
diminished the overall trust in international dispute settlement. 
 The root of the problem is threefold: First of all, general international law does not 
provide for jurisdiction-regulating rules.52 Second, in most cases the treaties establishing 
international courts and tribunals do not expressly provide rules governing their relationships 
with the jurisdictions of their counterparts or national jurisdictions.53 Third, jurisdictional 
provisions of individual international courts and tribunals are characterized by some degree of 
                                                
50 Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and control in international adjudication, 48 VA J INTL L 411, 448 (2007). 
51 Gilbert Guillaume, Advantages and Risks of Proliferation: A Blueprint for Action, 2 J. INT. CRIM. JUSTICE 300, 
303 (2004). See also M. Koskenniemi, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, para. 8, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006). 
52 BROWN, supra note 6 at 29. 
53 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LIS PENDENS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 441 (2009). 
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rigidity: as James Crawford puts it, it is precisely this lack of elasticity that produces the 
problems generally blamed on the proliferation phenomenon.54 
The use of comity has the potential of alleviating some of the problems arising from this 
rigidity, improving coordination between overlapping jurisdictions, and mitigating the 
undesired effects of unilateral forum shopping by encouraging a sound management of 
simultaneously pending proceedings and the choice of the most suitable forum. Further, it can 
serve as a theoretical basis to foster overall coordination between judicial bodies, prompting 
them to accord respect to the decisions of other international courts and tribunals and, more 
generally, creating a framework for their jurisdictional interaction—a framework which at the 
same time encourages cross-fertilization and ‘promotes the systematic nature of international 
law’.55 
B. Challenges in using comity for international adjudication 
A traditional understanding of comity, as we pointed out in section 1, links it to sovereignty. 
Can a principle developed to deal with issues regarding sovereignty – in a private international 
law dimension – be adequately used to deal with jurisdictional arrangements within the 
international judiciary? To answer the question, we first argue that horizontality, which is at the 
                                                
54 JAMES CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE: THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, GENERAL COURSE ON 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (2014). 
55 BROWN, supra note 6 at 29; YUVAL SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 179–80 (2007); passim Elisa D’Alterio, From judicial comity to legal comity: A judicial 
solution to global disorder?, 9 INT. J. CONST. LAW 394 (2011); GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND 
SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 117 (2013). 
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heart of sovereignty, is not an inappropriate ordering model for the relationship of the 
competences of international courts and tribunals. This in turn leads us to the transposition of 
conflicts of law to regime interactions. We finally take a step back from these considerations, 
which are arguably overly doctrinal and insufficiently pragmatic, and turn to comity as a tool 
of judicial reasoning. 
1. Horizontality as an ordering model 
The global arrangement of states is not so different from the global arrangement of international 
judicial bodies. As James Crawford puts it, comity ‘arises from the horizontal arrangements of 
state jurisdictions […] and the field’s lack of a hierarchical system of norms’.56 In the interstate 
system, horizontality is a consequence of the principle of sovereign equality of states; in the 
international system, it is the ordering model of the ‘new style of public international law 
litigation’.57  
It is true that not all international judicial bodies are created equal, with some having, 
according to an accepted classification, universal jurisdiction ratione personae, others a 
regional mandate, a general competence rationae materiae or a high degree of specialization.58 
However, despite some advocacy of a more central role for the International Court of Justice59, 
                                                
56 CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 485. 
57 MCLACHLAN, supra note 34, at 229–230. 
58 SHANY, supra note 6 at 2. 
59 The United Nations Charter, on the other hand, expressly provides for the possibility of entrusting disputes to 
other tribunals, either already in operation or to be created: Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 
UNTS XVI Article 95. 
COMITY AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
no tribunal currently holds such a central function60, and indeed one should recall that when the 
problem concerns international tribunals, ‘the notion of a court of general jurisdiction is an inapt 
analogy’.61 Some may have greater jurisdictional reach, but none formally stands out as 
hierarchically superior to the others: thus their potential clashes still occur in a horizontal 
dimension. 
 More intriguing is the problem of the exercise of comity by international courts towards 
national courts, and vice versa. As a principle, comity has sometimes been identified as the 
basis of particular aspects of the relationship between courts of different orders.62 The broader 
question, however, is whether it can help overcome the lack of jurisdictional rules and principles 
governing the relationship of their competences.63 Sovereignty-based arguments may cut both 
                                                
60 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the 
International Court of Justice, The, 31 NYU J. INTERNATIOAL LAW POLIT. 791, 798 (1998); Rosalyn Higgins, A 
Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, 55 INT. COMP. LAW Q. 791–804, 791 (2006); Ulfstein, 
supra note 48. 
61 James Crawford & Penelope Nevill, Relations between International Courts and Tribunals:  e “Regime 
Problem”, in REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 235, 249 (Margaret A. 
Young ed., 2012). 
62 SABINO CASSESE, I TRIBUNALI DI BABELE. I GIUDICI ALLA RICERCA DI UN NUOVO ORDINE GLOBALE 88–9 (2009). 
63 See Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to 
Jurisdiction, (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Société Générale v. Philippines]: the arbitral tribunal established its 
jurisdiction to hear the case, but stayed its proceedings in favour of the domestic courts, which had been selected 
as the appropriate forum in a contract clause through a decision on the admissibility of claims: the move has 
generally been described as based on comity. Michael Waibel, Coordinating Adjudication Processes,  in THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE , 505 (Zachary Douglas, 
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ways, but at least they are useful in justifying different types of ‘deferential review’ concerning 
the acts of a state.64 
2. Conflict of laws analogies and regime interaction 
If one takes on the view that jurisdictional clashes occur in a horizontal dimension, conflict of 
laws analogies become alluring, in particular if one has in mind the ‘jurisdictional’ nature of 
these clashes.65 Such comparisons are not novel, and have been employed to describe the 
overlaps between the functional jurisdictions of international organisations, which, as was 
submitted, presented ‘a closer analogy with the problem of conflict of laws than with the 
problem of conflicting obligations within the same legal system’.66 
 There is merit in the idea of these analogies, but how far they can be used in practice is 
a distinct question. From the perspective of an international adjudicator, it is possible to single 
out rather useful doctrines, such as those of governmental interest analysis or the ‘comparative 
                                                
Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014); SHANY, supra note 55 at 75–76; One of the arbitrators of the 
SGS case has expressly stated that the tribunal stayed its proceedings “in the interests of comity”: James Crawford, 
Continuity and Discontinuity in International Dispute Settlement: An Inaugural Lecture, 1 J. INT. DISPUTE SETTL. 
3–24, 20 (2010); on the distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility see Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and 
admissibility,  GLOB. REFLECT. INT. LAW COMMER. DISPUTE RESOLUT. 601 (2010). 
64 For example, the margin of appreciation doctrine has been considered one such example: SHANY, supra note 55 
at 185. 
65 For a critique of this ‘temptation’ see JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2003). 
66 C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BR. YEAR B. INT. LAW 401–453, 403 (1953); See 
also Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional linkage: Transcending“ trade and...,” 96 AM. J. INT. LAW 77–93 (2002). 
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impairment principle’. With some simplification, the first requires the interpreter to look to the 
specific policy goals underlying the provisions to be applied.67 The second ‘requires the 
interpreter to weigh the relative interests of the conflicting legal systems’ with a view to 
determining which among them ‘would be most greatly impaired by a legal decision, assuming 
that that decision were to become a general practice’.68 
 The main problem with these conflict of law approaches is that, while they are 
implemented at the judicial level, they mainly relate to choice of law matters, and cannot do 
much for the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts—as such—between courts. The perspective 
may change slightly when it comes to the application of substantive law, or when international 
adjudication is embedded, as it often is, in a certain ‘regime’. Granted, the very use of the word 
‘regime’, in the sense of ‘regime interactions’, which is a loan from international relations 
literature, is somewhat controversial in the field of international law. But it is not without 
analytical purchase. Broadly, regime interactions scholarship deals with sets of norms, 
decision-making procedures and organisations coalescing around functional issue-areas’.69 
More to the point, it addresses questions relating to overlaps of these areas and their conflicts, 
and methods with which certain agents—such as international organisations—should engage in 
                                                
67 BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. (1963); For a concise critique of this approach 
see PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS 252 (2012). 
68 On the principle of comparative impairment see William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 
STANFORD LAW REV. 1–42 (1963); DIRK PULKOWSKI, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME 
CONFLICT 331 ff (2014). 
69 Margaret A. Young, Introduction: The Productive Friction Between Regimes,  in REGIME INTERACTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 1, 23 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012). 
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interaction and accommodation, and the basis of any such power to do so. What we must 
observe, in this regard, is that the function of an international court cannot be easily isolated 
from the regime to which it pertains. Their judicial process, and ‘the law-making that occurs 
contingently in litigation’, have implications that have bearing on the interaction between 
different regimes.70 In the search for a solution to jurisdictional conflicts, this perspective must 
perforce be taken into account.  
3. Comity: between judicial tool and meta-principle of coordination 
Comity may offer a possible solution to conflicts occurring between international jurisdictionss. 
As a concept, it pertains to the realm of judicial reasoning and behaviour. As Crawford and 
Nevill have observed, judges and arbitrators owe allegiance to their jurisdictional mandate, and 
their approaches in seeking coordination—rather than competition—between different regimes 
might be described as a ‘meta-position’, or even as an exercise of imagination.71  Still, as the 
authors continue, there is no ‘informing meta-principle’ from which easy answers can be 
drawn.72 Rather, when jurisdictional overlaps between international courts and tribunals are 
seen as a form of regime conflict and interaction, we are left with the troublesome realisation 
that no hard and fast rules exist for their resolution, though concerns about legitimacy and the 
risk of managerialism are hard to deflect.73 
                                                
70 Crawford and Nevill, supra note 61 at 260. 
71 Id. at 251.; PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION 204 (2013). 
72 Crawford and Nevill, supra note 61 at 259. 
73 MARGARET A. YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH 276, 295 (2011). 
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The arguments for hard rules and final arbiters are quite compelling, but, so far, these 
are desiderata that do not lie in the realm of what is accessible. What we do have, instead, is the 
understanding that conflicts can be otherwise managed. ‘A problem’, Philip Jessup wrote in his 
Storrs lectures, ‘may also be resolved not by the application of law (although equally not in 
violation of law) but by a process of adjustment—an extralegal or metajuridical means’.74 
Comity is one such principle—or ‘meta-principle’.75 Its potential, which we attempted to 
unpack in the previous sections, is revealed by its historical evolution and continual application 
at the domestic (so to speak) level. We submit that, lacking (unlikely) hierarchical solutions, 
comity may assist international courts and tribunals in mediating jurisdictional conflicts 
between themselves, balancing their coordination efforts with the need to keep track of the need 
to provide justice in individual cases.76 
Of course, ‘managerialism’ is a risk, and the proposition that the degree to which judges 
are required to strive for the ‘maintenance of the integrity of the international legal system… 
[and] the broader idea of an international rule of law’ is hardly uncontested.77 Still, it can hardly 
                                                
74 PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 6 (1956). 
75 Crawford and Nevill, supra note 61 at 243. 
76 CRAWFORD, supra note 54 at 208. 
77 Andreas Paulus, International Adjudication,  in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 221 (Samantha 
Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). For a law and process perspective, consider ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS 
AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 10 (1995). See also W. Michael Reisman, “Case 
Specific Mandates” versus “Systemic Implications”: How Should Investment Tribunals Decide?: The Freshfields 
Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARBITR. INT. 131–152 (2013). 
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be doubted that international adjudication has overcome its quasi-arbitral beginnings78, and that, 
when it comes to the proper and sound administration of justice (a concept, we should perhaps 
emphasise, which has deeper moral implications than that of ‘the rule of law’79), community 
interests (or something much akin to them) are at stake.80 As far as international courts and 
tribunals are concerned, judges pursue these interests the best way they can, through the use of 
shared assumptions, methodological tools, the responsible use of legal doctrine, and—perhaps 
most importantly—with the limitations that their own professions calls for.81 
 Comity does not simply respond to the hopes for coordination within the international 
judiciary—and, more broadly, the international legal system. It is also something that 
international adjudicators can and know how to employ in order to attain these goals. With this 
in mind, comity might be set to be employed to ease other types of conflict, for example, as a 
principle informing the use by certain international tribunals of extrasystemic elements 
imported from other legal regimes, for indeed the use of such ‘outside law’ is not devoid of 
complications and calls for a careful balancing of the interests at stake.82 
                                                
78 Paulus, supra note 77 at 223. 
79 Thomas Schultz, Against Consistency in Investment Arbitration,  in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 297 (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, & Jorge E. 
Viñuales eds., 2014)passim. 
80 On community interests see B. Simma, From bilateralism to community interest in international law, Vol. 250 
(1994) Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 217, passim. 
81 Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. INT. LAW 
265–297, 234 (2009); Crawford and Nevill, supra note 61 at 249; PULKOWSKI, supra note 68. 
82 José E. Alvarez, “Beware: Boundary Crossings” – A Critical Appraisal of Public Law Approaches to 
International Investment Law, 17 J. WORLD INVEST. AMP TRADE 171–228 (2016); VALENTINA VADI, ANALOGIES 
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C. An uncertain umpire? The case of competing proceedings 
What type of relief exactly could comity provide to the problem of jurisdictional conflicts? 
Answering this question requires a more advanced understanding of the problem of regulation 
of jurisdiction in international adjudication. This section examines the potential of comity as an 
instrument to be employed to alleviate the ill-effects deriving from the pendence of parallel 
proceedings in the same dispute. 
1. The regulation of jurisdiction: jurisdictional clauses and general principles 
General international law does not provide for rules governing the jurisdiction of international 
courts and tribunals, but the constituting instruments of the latter often do. Normally, they do 
so indirectly, namely through their jurisdictional clauses. According to the classification 
proposed by Yuval Shany, it is possible to distinguish between exclusive jurisdictional clauses, 
barring litigation before any other forum, and non-exclusive jurisdictional clauses.83 Exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses can be further qualified as flexible or inflexible, depending on whether they 
can be derogated from; non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses can be unqualified or residual, such 
as Article 282 UNCLOS.84 The latter species of jurisdictional clauses may be chosen for the 
                                                
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION (2015). On this type of regime interaction and the 
implications for international governmental organisations (as a possible analogy) see YOUNG, supra note 73 at 
279. 
83 SHANY, supra note 6 at 179–80. 
84 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, Article 282, providing 
that ‘If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this 
Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, 
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purpose of limiting, to some extent, unilateral forum shopping.85 In contrast, very few 
instruments include rules intended to coordinate multiple proceedings and, more broadly, 
mediate conflicts.86 
 It has been argued that, in the absence of a hierarchical system, the instruments to 
achieve these results are to be found ‘outside the framework of their legal order’.87 The central 
question is whether the vacuum can be filled with general jurisdiction-regulating principles. 
One such principle is res judicata, a preclusion doctrine aimed at protecting the finality of the 
decision. Its applicability in international adjudication is well accepted,88 though recent judicial 
                                                
at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure 
shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree.’ 
85 SHANY, supra note 6 at 202–4. 
86 For example, see the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Jun. 27, 1981, 1520 UNTS 217, 
21 ILM 58 (1982). According to Shany, Article 56(7) of the African Charter (barring the admissibility of 
communication from ‘other sources’ dealing with cases ‘which have been settled by these States involved in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of the Organization of African 
Unity or the provisions of the present Charter’) must be considered an implied res judicata clause: Id. at 225. 
87 MCLACHLAN, supra note 53 at 455; Waibel, supra note 63 at 522. 
88 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 2007 ICJ REP 43, 89, paras. 114-120 (Feb. 26). See also BIN CHENG, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 336 (1994); Joost 
Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible 
Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT. LAW J., 104 (2009); August Reinisch, The Use and Limits of Res Judicata and Lis 
Pendens as Procedural Tools to Avoid Conflicting Dispute Settlement Outcomes, 3 LAW PRACT. INT. COURTS 
TRIB. 37–77, 44 (2004); SHANY, supra note 6 at 245. 
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practice demonstrates that there still is some degree of uncertainty as to its practical operation.89 
There is ample agreement that for res judicata to apply strict conditions must be satisfied: these 
are normally reduced to a ‘triple identity test’, which is intended to ascertain that persona, 
petitum, and causa petendi of the multiple disputes are in fact the same.90 In international 
adjudication, this is easier said than done: due to a plethora of different treaty regimes, 
jurisdiction and cause of action are intimately linked and meeting the conditions for the 
operation of the principle is unlikely.91  Further, especially in investment arbitration, it is quite 
possible that multiple arbitrations will be initiated by formally different entities.92 As a 
consequence, there is a renewed interest in less restrictive doctrine such as issue estoppel.93 
While res judicata is intended to shield from the undesired consequences of sequential 
proceedings, lis alibi pendens deals with parallel proceedings, giving priority to the ones first 
established. Compared to res judicata, its applicability in international adjudication does not 
enjoy the same widespread support.94 Overall, the number of cases involving the principle has 
                                                
89 See for example the decision, delivered by a split Court with the casting vote of the president, in Question of the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, 17 March 2016, unreported (available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/154/18956.pdf>). 
90 Factory at Chorzów: Interpretation Case (Germany v. Poland) 1927 PCIJ, Series A, No. 13, 4, at 23 (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Anzilotti); Pauwelyn and Salles, supra note 88 at 103. 
91 Id. at 104. 
92 Waibel, supra note 63 at 523. 
93 Id. at 523. 
94 Reinisch, supra note 88 at 123 (justifying the principle as a corollary of res judicata); MCLACHLAN, supra note 
53 at 500 Arguing that the principle should be applied, and that it does not import a strict “first seized” requirement. 
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been comparatively low, and no tribunal has authoritatively pronounced on the issue.95 Further, 
its status as a general principle of law has been disputed on the grounds that it is mainly a civil 
law doctrine,96 and it too does, in any event, require the satisfaction of a strict triple identity 
test.97 
Moreover, while the application of res judicata enjoys virtually universal support as a 
matter of policy, the use of lis pendens has, at least on occasion, been criticised. First, it has 
been observed that the simple fact that a tribunal has already been given jurisdiction does not 
constitute a guarantee that a dispute will be settled.98 Second, it has been argued that the increase 
in litigation costs is a minor and, in any event, secondary issue in international adjudication.99 
This proposition is not entirely convincing, and does not take into account other adverse effects 
                                                
Against this proposition, see CRAWFORD, supra note 54 at 80; SHANY, supra note 6 (arguing that the status of the 
principle is still unclear). 
95 MCLACHLAN, supra note 53 at 500; CRAWFORD, supra note 54 at 383. It may be further observed that the 
Permanent Court of International Justice considered, but did not pronounce on the issue (as the ‘triple identity test’ 
could not, in any event, be satisfied) in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (1925) PCIJ Rep, Series 
A No 6, 20. 
96 Gilles Cuniberti, Parallel litigation and foreign investment dispute settlement, 21 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVEST. 
LAW J. 381, 383 (2006). 
97 Pauwelyn and Salles, supra note 88 at 110. 
98 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) (Jurisdiction) PCIJ Rep Series A No 9, at 30. 
Cuniberti, supra note 96 at 143. 
99 Pauwelyn and Salles, supra note 88 at 109. 
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of duplicative litigation on any given dispute.100 Third, and perhaps more interesting, is the 
contention that the pendence of parallel proceedings could be an incentive for proverbially slow 
tribunals to issue their judgment first, a result that can only be achieved if res judicata applies 
and lis alibi pendens does not, encouraging a ‘race to ruling’, rather than a race to court.101 
2. On the exercise of jurisdiction: comity and inherent powers 
In the current international dispute settlement scenario, comity has appeal as a technique for the 
management of jurisdictional conflicts arising from the commencement of multiple proceedings 
before different courts or tribunals.  
When domestic courts employ comity, they do so by dismissing or staying proceedings, 
thus adopting a decision not to exercise a jurisdiction that they indubitably have. The resolution 
of conflicts concerning the allocation of regulatory (or jurisdictional) authority tends to take 
this form, demanding the surrender of legal (or judicial) authority from one legal system or 
regime to another.102 The same applies in international adjudication, where coordination efforts 
have been broadly labelled as exercises in avoidance and temporisation.103 
                                                
100 The creation of a plurality of fora along “narrow functionalist lines” and their overlapping authority is certainly 
detrimental to weaker states: Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The empire’s new clothes: political economy 
and the fragmentation of international law,  STANFORD LAW REV. 595–631 (2007). 
101 Pauwelyn and Salles, supra note 88 at 109; Waibel, supra note 63 at 518. 
102 A. Pillet, ‘Théorie Continentale des Conflits de Lois’, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International 
Vol. 2 (1924) 451 at 472. See also PULKOWSKI, supra note 68 at 330–31. 
103 Jeffrey L Dunoff, A New Approach to Regime Interaction,  in REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
FACING FRAGMENTATION , 156 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2012). 
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Judicial discretion of this kind has faced comparatively few challenges at the domestic 
level, at least in common law countries, where it is more characteristic: doubts as to the 
authority of a court of general jurisdiction to do so remain the exception. Things tend to be 
different for international tribunals: do they or do they not have the power, in their discretion, 
to stay or dismiss proceedings? To be sure, it is possible for such a power to be provided for 
expressly.104 However, the constitutive instruments of international courts and tribunals are 
seldom exhaustive and, in order to fill the gap, reliance has been placed on alternative sources 
of procedural rules and the more controversial concept of ‘inherent power’. 
 One possible solution is to qualify comity as a principle of international law105 or a 
general principle of law in the sense of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice.106 Debates as to the suitability of such principles to constitute a source of procedural 
law have been largely overcome, and the proposition that that ‘no sharp distinction’ exists in 
international law between substantive and adjectival aspects is relatively uncontroversial.107 It 
must be pointed out, however, that the scarcity of practice does not appear to warrant the 
conclusion that comity fits squarely in the first category; by the same token, the fact that the 
                                                
104 SHANY, supra note 55 at 172. 
105 We accept the definition employed in CRAWFORD, supra note 14 at 37 (“certain logical propositions underlying 
judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law”). 
106 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1). SHANY, supra note 6 at 261. 
107 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-2005 1023 (2005); 
BROWN, supra note 6 at 37. 
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principle of comity does not enjoy universal acceptance at the domestic level seems to militate 
against it inclusion in the second.108 
 A preferable alternative is to find the source of discretion not to exercise jurisdiction in 
the inherent powers of international courts and tribunals.109 As Judge Higgins observed in her 
separate opinion in the Use of Force cases, the inherent powers of a tribunal include that of not 
exercising a jurisdiction that it has.110 Specifically, such powers are a corollary of the judicial 
character of the tribunal and descend from the need to protect the integrity of the judicial 
process. Their exercise is thus to be considered possible, if exceptional.111 In other words, in 
                                                
108 SHANY, supra note 55 at 172. This result is not surprising: while it is accepted that general principles of law 
may be sources of procedure, very few of them are applied extensively at the national level. Chester Brown, The 
Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, 76 BR. YEARB. INT. LAW 195–244, 195 (2006); For an in-
depth discussion of general principles of law see CHENG, supra note 88. 
109 CRAWFORD, supra note 54 at 210. 
110 Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium), Preliminary Objections, 2004 ICJ REP. 1307, 
1361, para. 10 (Dec. 15) (Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins). It should be clarified that the problem at issue was 
that of the possibility of summarily dismiss abusive claims. See Brown, A Common Law, supra note 5, 249. The 
language is to be compared with the dictum in Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. UK), Preliminary Objections, 
1963 ICJ REP. 29 (Dec. 2): “[T]he Court is not compelled in every case to exercise that jurisdiction. There are 
inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function which the Court, as a court of justice, can never 
ignore… The Court itself, and not the parties, must be the guardian of the Court's judicial integrity”. 
111 Ibid. para.12. Caroline Henckels, Overcoming jurisdictional isolationism at the WTO–FTA nexus: a potential 
approach for the WTO, 19 EUR. J. INT. LAW 571–599, 585 (2008).. Judge Higgins referred to the Court’s dictum 
in Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1974 ICJ REP. 253, 322 (Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Onyeama, 
Dillard, Jiménez de Aréchaga and Waldock): ‘for the Court to discharge itself from carrying out [the primary 
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this approach, inherent powers must be justified on the basis of the function of the international 
court concerned—and, arguably, of the general function of international adjudication: this last 
point warrants further consideration as it implies the question of whether the role of 
international courts and tribunals should be restricted to the settlement of the particular dispute 
between the parties or have wider implications.112  
 The ‘inherent powers’ approach is advantageous for two main reasons: first, it allows 
rejecting the misconstruction of comity as a jurisdictional rule and qualifying it as a set of 
principles that should inform the exercise of jurisdiction.113 Second, it allows dispensing with 
an express provision of the power to stay or dismiss proceedings in the constitutive instrument 
of the tribunal. Nevertheless, there are limits to its operation: in general, the existence of an 
inherent power could be excluded by a provision or by the effect of either the constitutive 
instrument as a whole or the very function of an international tribunal.114 It is doubtful, for 
example, whether an exclusive jurisdictional clause could warrant the exercise of such 
discretion. By the same token, it is up to question whether certain dispute settlement bodies 
possess the discretion to stay proceedings. 
                                                
obligation of deciding disputes in accordance with international law] must be considered as highly exceptional and 
a step to be taken only when the most cogent considerations of judicial propriety so require’.  
112 Brown, supra note 108 at 73. 
113 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Principle of Compétence-Compétence in International Adjudication,  in 
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN , 1059 
(Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & Jacob Cogan eds., 2011). 
114 Brown, supra note 108 at 91. 
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 The case of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can provide a useful illustration of 
the problem. The existence of such discretion for the panels has been questioned for different 
reasons. For example, it has been contended that they lack inherent powers due to the atypical 
nature of such bodies: a power to suspend proceedings would thus have to be based on different 
grounds.115 Others have argued that a power to stay proceedings should be excluded on the 
grounds of the strict procedures and timeframes the panels are bound to respect.116 Finally, in 
Mexico–Soft Drinks the Panel rejected Mexico’s request not to exercise its jurisdiction 
maintaining that it did not have ‘discretion to decide whether or not to exercise [it] in a case 
properly before it’.117 The Appellate Body upheld the approach followed by the Panel in 
Mexico–Soft Drinks, arguing that the Panel would not have fulfilled its mandate of making ‘an 
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of 
the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements’ if it had 
                                                
115 Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 53 INT. COMP. LAW 
Q. 861 (2004); Friedl Weiss, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, 1995-2003 , 885 (Federico Ortino & 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004). According to Bartels, the panels or the appellate body are not plagued with 
a complete lack of power to regulate their proceedings, but still have to base its decision on a positive grant of 
authority under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. He concludes that it would be possible for a panel or 
the Appellate Body to suspend its proceedings on the basis of the Working Procedures they can adopt under Article 
12.1 (or 17.9, for the Appellate Body) DSU irrespective of the consent of the parties. As the Working Procedures 
are adopted for the purpose of hearing a particular case, it would not be possible to use them to decline jurisdiction 
altogether, but the result of a suspension of proceedings might be attainable. 
116 SHANY, supra note 55 at 265. 
117 WTO, Panel Report, Mexico—Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Report of the Panel, 7 October 
2005, WT/DS308/R, paras. 7.4–7.18. 
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declined to exercise a validly established jurisdiction.118 According to Caroline Henckels, such 
an approach is rooted in ‘arid textualism’ and might be overcome by paying due regard to the 
purpose of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.119 Comity, she further argues, could thus 
be used upon meeting the high threshold of ‘an inextricable connection to an antecedent or 
concurrent dispute under another trade instrument… bearing in mind the need to ensure stability 
and predictability in the international trading system’.120 Such a conclusion seems correct in 
principle. What is more, it is also buttressed by the recent practice of a number of international 
courts and tribunals, which have demonstrated an increasing willingness to suspend 
proceedings before them.121 However, the extent to which other tribunals will be willing to do 
so is still up to question. 
3. The potential of comity: advantages and drawbacks 
The application of the doctrine of comity has a number of advantages. First of all, as a general 
abstention doctrine, it does not need to be provided for expressly in the constitutive instrument 
of the tribunal concerned: provided that the tribunal possesses the powers necessary to exercise 
comity it constitutes a readily available remedy against the dangers of abusive litigation.122 
Second, and more attractive, its flexible character allows the decision-maker to defer the dispute 
                                                
118 WTO, Mexico—Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, 3 June 2006, 
WT/DS308/AB/R, paras. 4.4–4.14. 
119 Henckels, supra note 111 at 589–95. 
120 Id. at 597. 
121 BROWN, supra note 6 at 250–52. 
122 SHANY, supra note 6 at 280. 
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to the jurisdiction of other tribunals in a number of cases, without the need to satisfy the strict 
requirements of either res judicata, lis alibi pendens and, where similarities apply, electa una 
via provisions. Third, comity is predicated on the postulate that the tribunal exercising it has 
jurisdiction: in that it is not necessarily different from the principles considered above, which 
are more accurately classified as concerning the admissibility of claims.123 But the argument 
may be made that res judicata and lis alibi pendens are hard-edged principles. Specifically, 
they are preclusion doctrines: as a consequence, as soon as the requirements for their operation 
are met, they bar the adjudicator from entertaining the dispute.124 In contrast, the doctrine of 
comity simply results in a tribunal using its discretion and refraining from exercising a 
jurisdiction it has when hearing the case would not be appropriate. As a consequence, it does 
not deprive the tribunal of its power to hear the dispute when the reasons not to do so (such as, 
for example, simultaneously pending proceedings), albeit formally compelling, prove shaky as 
a matter of substance. 
 Using comity is not entirely unproblematic: its operation is subject to the tribunal 
exercising discretion, an idea that many constituencies could find problematic when associated 
with adjudication. From the parties’ perspective, preclusion arguments may indeed be more 
attractive: a tribunal may have variegated reasons to be hesitant in declining to exercise its 
jurisdiction. Its members may simply be convinced that they do not have the power to make 
this decision, and err on the side of caution and give the parties their proverbial ‘day in court’. 
                                                
123 Pauwelyn and Salles, supra note 88; Gretta L. Walters, Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole: Do Res 
Judicata Challenges in International Arbitration Constitute Jurisdictional or Admissibility Problems?, 29 J. INT. 
ARBITR. 651–680, 93 (2012121). 
124 Ibid., at 83. 
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Reluctance of this kind may also occur even if there is no legal impediment: the conduct of the 
international judiciary, just as of any body of individuals, is not only affected by considerations 
of justice and the parties’ interests. For example, as Cesare P. R. Romano points out, permanent 
tribunals could be reluctant to defer a dispute to other judicial bodies due to the fear that doing 
so could negatively affect their status in the area of international dispute settlement and the 
problematic correlation between caseload and funding.125 In contrast, the members of arbitral 
tribunal can be said to have, from a law and economics perspective, a vested interest in making 
the dispute reach the merits stage. It makes sense for them to increase the demand for 
arbitration.126 
And, of course, even then mistakes may be made. An example can help clarify the 
problem: in the MOX Plant case, the Annex VII Tribunal relied on comity to avoid a 
jurisdictional conflict, and, insofar as it based the decision on the virtually certain involvement 
of the European Court of Justice, its approach seems to be informed by a correct, if overly 
prudent and deferential, understanding of the principle.127 But, as Campbell McLachlan has 
observed, the tribunal adopted its decision before the European Court, which undoubtedly has 
the competence to decide on its jurisdiction, was even seized of the dispute. It is thus arguable 
that, had the tribunal decided otherwise, its exercise of jurisdiction would not have infringed 
comity as no proceedings had been initiated; what is more—and, perhaps, most importantly—
                                                
125 Guillaume, supra note 51; Romano, supra note 49 at 301. 
126 See generally Thomas Schultz, Arbitral Decision-Making: Legal Realism and Law & Economics, 6 J. INT. 
DISPUTE SETTL. 231–251 (2015). 
127 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (UNCLOS, Annex VII, Tribunal, Order of 14 November 2003) 
126 ILR 310 [21]. 
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the risk of leaving Ireland without any proceedings against the United Kingdom was a real 
one.128 
3. Mentions of comity by international courts and tribunals 
The foregoing sections have sought to clarify, at a theoretical level, the potential and 
shortcomings of the use of comity in international adjudication. In this section, we look more 
empirically at cases in which comity has indeed been used. 
A. Comity as Opposed to ‘Legal Obligations’ 
First of all, in a number of cases, international courts and tribunals have employed the notion 
of comity to clarify the legal nature of an obligation. For example, in Fisheries Jurisdiction, 
Judge Dillard appended a separate opinion in which he argued that ‘in practice States accord 
deference to the 12-mile limit as a matter of legal obligation and not merely as a matter of 
reciprocal tolerance or comity’.129  
In Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) the concept was only mentioned in passing in 
Judge ad hoc Barwick’s dissent, in which he criticized the view that the dispute at issue was 
only a political difference ‘as to whether France ought or ought not in comity to cease to test in 
                                                
128 The argument has also been made that, in affirming its exclusive jurisdiction, the European Court of Justice de 
facto negated that the Annex VII Tribunal could rule on its competence: MCLACHLAN, supra note 53 at 454. A 
different narrative, however, is also possible: against the idea that the European Court proceeded some sort of 
usurpation, see Crawford and Nevill, supra note 61 at 254. 
129 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) (Merits), 1974 ICJ REP. 3, 58 (Jul. 25) (separate opinion of 
Judge Dillard). 
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the atmosphere of the South Pacific’. In his opinion, there was a legal dispute and that the 
Court’s finding that Australia application had no object was incorrect.130  
Again, in Avena, the issue of comity was raised in Mexico’s argument at the provisional 
measures stage.131 On the basis of a declaration of the president of the United States to the effect 
that the USA would have  ‘discharged their international obligations under the decision of the 
International Court of Justice… in accordance with general principles of comity’, Mexico 
argued that the reference to comity the United States made clear that it did not believe to have 
any legal obligation. The Court did not address the issue. Finally, in Jurisdictional Immunities, 
the Court referred to the concept of comity to observe that the parties were in agreement as to 
the applicable law and, in particular, they agreed that ‘immunity is governed by international 
law and is not a mere matter of comity’.132 
A similar interpretation of the term has also been espoused by the European Court of 
Human Rights in Mamatkulov. In this case, the Court observed that previous practice had 
described the practice of complying with interim measures as ‘a matter of expediency and 
comity’.133 
                                                
130 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France) 1974 ICJ REP. 253, 446 (Dec. 20) (dissenting opinion of Judge Barwick. 
131 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) 1974 ICJ REP. 311 (Jul. 16). See also the Dissenting opinion of 
Judge Buergenthal. 
132 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) 2012 ICJ REP. 99 para.53 (Feb. 
3). 
133 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005-I, para 5. 
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B. Comity as Non-Interference  
In a second group of cases, references to comity were made in connection with non-interference 
arguments.  
The principle was referred to in Loewen as the source of the requirement of ‘continuous 
nationality’.134 According to the tribunal, the principle arose as a consequence of the fact that 
‘[i]t was not normally the business of one nation to be interfering into the manner in which 
another nation handled its internal commerce’.135  
Two cases of the Court of Justice of the European Communities concerned issues of 
regulation of competition: the first, Ahlström v. Commission, was part of the joined ‘wood pulp’ 
cases.136 The comity argument was raised by a number of Canadian applicants contended that 
regulating their conduct – relating to activities performed outside of, but having effects within 
Europe – the Commission had ‘infringed Canada’s sovereignty and thus breached the principle 
of international comity.137 The Court quickly dismissed the argument, stating that it amounted 
to questioning the Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules.138 IBM v. 
Commission concerned entirely similar issues, the main difference being that the conduct of the 
claimant was not only performed in another jurisdiction (the United States), but also the subject 
                                                
134 ICSID, Loewen Group Incorporated and Loewen (Raymond L.) v. United States - Award, 26 June 2003, ICSID 
Case No ARB(AF)/98/3. 
135 Ibid. para 223. 
136 Case C-89/85, Ahlström v Commission (Woodpulp II), [1993] ECR 1307. 
137 Ibid. para. 8. 
138 Ibid. para. 22. 
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of legal proceedings there.139 The Court did not address the claim, and dismissed it on other 
grounds. To this day, the Court has not modified its approach, and a recent decision by the 
General Court referring to Ahlström reveals that the timeworn dictum withstands the test of 
time.140   
C. Comity and the Management of Multiple Proceedings 
In a third category of cases, references to comity concerned the coordination of multiple 
proceedings relating to the same dispute pending before different national or international 
judicial bodies.  
Perhaps the best-known instance of the use of comity was considered in relation to 
parallel proceedings is the early ICSID case Southern Pacific Properties.141 The dispute at issue 
had been referred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce and only later 
ICSID proceedings were initiated. As domestic proceedings concerning the arbitration clause 
were pending before the French Cour de Cassation, the Tribunal was faced with the request to 
decline its jurisdiction. Eventually, the tribunal stayed its proceedings, but went to great lengths 
to clarify that, it was doing so ‘in the interest of international judicial order’, ‘in its discretion 
and as a matter of comity’. In its view, there was no rule of international law preventing two 
tribunals whose jurisdictions extended to the same dispute from exercising such jurisdiction.142 
                                                
139 Case C-60/81, IBM v. Commission, [1981] ECR 2639, 2643, at 2650. 
140 Case T-406/08, ICF v. Commission (General Court, Jun. 18, 2013). Available at http://curia.europa.eu.  
141 ICSID, Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt – Decision on Jurisdiction, 
27 November 1985, ICSID Case No ARB/84/3. 
142 Ibid. 129. 
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Questions relating to comity were considered again in the MOX Plant case.143 There the 
PCA Annex VII Tribunal relied on ‘considerations of mutual respect and comity which should 
prevail between judicial institutions’ to justify the suspension of its proceedings in the face of 
a virtually certain involvement of the European Court of Justice.144 Such an occurrence would 
have excluded the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Article 282 of the UNCLOS. Comity was also 
mentioned in the separate opinion appended by Judge Treves to the Order on Provisional 
Measures issued by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the same dispute.145 
Treves regretted that a discussion on the existence and content ‘of a customary law rule or of a 
general principle concerning the consequences of litispendence, as well as considerations of 
economy of legal activity and of comity between courts and tribunals’ had not been included in 
the order.146 
Comity arguments were also raised in Itera International Energy.147 The respondent 
maintained that the claimant was trying to bring before the ICSID Tribunal, under the cloak of 
ancillary claims, a wholly separate dispute, which was already the subject of separate 
proceedings before the International Commercial Arbitration Court of the Russian Chamber of 
Commerce. These proceedings had been initiated by the claimant and had been going on for 
                                                
143 Ireland v. United Kingdom (‘MOX Plant Case’) (Order No 3) (UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal, PCA).  
144 Ibid. 28. 
145 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Request for Provisional Measures (Order), ITLOS Case No 10, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Treves.  
146 Ibid. para.5. 
147 ICSID, Itera International Energy LLC and Itera Group NV v Georgia - Admissibility of Ancillary Claims, 3 
December 2009, ICSID Case No ARB/08/7. 
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three years. According to the respondent, the Tribunal’s dismissal of these claims would have 
avoided potentially conflicting decisions and served the interests of ‘efficiency and comity’.148 
Eventually, the claims were not found to arise from the same dispute and the Tribunal did not 
address the issue of comity.149 
The issue of comity was raised again in Achmea.150 The European Commission had 
submitted written observations to propose a stay of the PCA proceedings in order to avoid a 
potential conflict between its decision and an ensuing ECJ ruling. It suggested that the PCA 
adopted the same approach embraced in MOX Plant, where the arbitral tribunal had concluded 
that ‘considerations of mutual respect and comity’ warranted a stay of proceedings. According 
to the Commission, such considerations formed ‘part of the general principles of law that the 
Tribunal must apply by virtue of Article 8(6) of the BIT’.151 Ultimately, the tribunal concluded 
that while the Tribunal wished to organize its proceedings ‘with full regard for considerations 
of mutual respect and comity as regards other courts and institutions’ it did not consider the 
questions in issue ‘so far coextensive with the claims in the present case’ to warrant a decision 
of suspension of the proceedings.152 Yet, the tribunal left open the possibility of a later 
                                                
148 Ibid. para.81. 
149 Ibid. para.100. 
150 PCA, Achmea BV (Formerly Eureko BV). v. Slovakia – Award on Jurisdiction, 26 October 2010, PCA Case 
No 2008-13. 
151 Ibid. para.196. 
152 Ibid. para. 292. 
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suspension if it were to become clear ‘that the relationship between the two sets of proceedings 
is so close as to be a cause of procedural unfairness or serious inefficiency’.153 
Finally, questions concerning comity and the management of multiple proceedings were 
discussed, rather thoroughly, in British Caribbean Bank.154 In this case, the Respondent had 
invoked the precedents of Southern Pacific Properties and MOX Plant to the argue that, when 
parallel proceedings are pending, a Tribunal may ‘in its discretion and as a matter of comity’ 
stay the exercise of its jurisdiction.155 The argument was accepted as a matter of principle, and 
the Tribunal admitted that it had ‘a measure of discretion with respect to the timing and conduct 
of the arbitration and that municipal judicial proceedings may sometimes need to be taken into 
account in the exercise of international comity’. However, the Tribunal also observed that any 
such discretion ‘must be carefully exercised’, for to do otherwise would have amounted to 
‘permit comity to frustrate a claimant’s right to the arbitral forum and, potentially, to the relief 
offered by the bilateral investment treaty under which the arbitration proceedings were 
commenced’.156 In this respect, the Tribunal observed, the situation in the case at issue was 
entirely different from the precedent cited, as a stay would not have been motivated by either 
an exclusive jurisdictional clause included in a contract (as in SGS) or the exclusive jurisdiction 
vested in a certain forum by a treaty.157 What is more, its determinations did not depend from 
                                                
153 Ibid. 
154 PCA, British Caribbean Bank Limited v. The Government of Belize - Award, 19 Dember 2014, PCA Case No 
2010-18. 
155 Ibid. para. 179. 
156 Ibid. para. 187. 
157 Ibid. para. 188. 
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the result of any action before the domestic court, and, even then, none were currently 
pending.158  
D. Comity as respect and recognition 
International juridical bodies have also relied on comity in order to assist their reasoning about 
the respect to be granted to what we may broadly refer to as the regulatory space of states: what 
faith and credit should be accorded to states regarding their own conduct? What are the 
appropriate evidential weight, evidential requirements, and standards of review for the conduct 
of states? Four cases point the way. 
In Soufraki, an investment arbitration, a reference to comity appears in Omar Nabulsi’s 
dissenting opinion.159 The question concerned certificates of nationality issued by the Italian 
government. According to Nabulsi, the tribunal had the power to make determinations of 
nationality, but these had to be made in accordance with the proper law, which was, in the case 
at issue, Italian law. In his view, ‘The Tribunal’s application of rules other than the substantive 
rules of Italian law would be a manifest excess of power’.160 Nabulsi went on to ask whether 
the ‘Act of State’ doctrine applied to the issue. This would have required that the tribunal 
‘abstain[s] from inquiring into the validity of acts of the government of another country’, 
namely the certificates of nationality. He answered the question in the negative, finding that the 
doctrine did not apply to international tribunals whose jurisdiction depends on the parties’ 
                                                
158 Ibid. para. 189. 
159 ICSID, Soufraki v United Arab Emirates - Decision on the Application for Annulment, 5 June 2007, ICSID 
Case No ARB/02/7, Separate Opinion and Statement of Dissent by Omar Nabulsi. 
160 Ibid. para.62. 
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nationality.161 So the power of the tribunal to go beyond official certificates was not up for 
debate. Yet, and this is the key point, he maintained that the concept of ‘comity’ required that 
‘international tribunals should accord respect to official certificates by treating them as ‘prima 
facie evidence’’.162  
A similar reference to comity and evidence, though dealing with a qualitatively different 
issue, was made in Tokios Tokelės, also an investment arbitration.163 The tribunal held that, 
when addressing the issue of allegations made against persons or bodies ‘in a position of [state] 
authority’, evidentiary requirements could not be ‘heightened purely on the grounds of 
deference or comity or otherwise’.164 
In CCL, a commercial arbitration decided by a SCC Tribunal, the issue of comity was 
raised with reference to the possibility of reviewing the conduct of a foreign state.165 The 
principle was invoked by the respondent, who argued that ‘as a matter of international comity’ 
the Tribunal should have been hesitant to review the acts of Kazakhstan in its sovereign and 
judicial capacity, acting to enforce its laws against its own government agency, absent a blatant 
abuse of power, which clearly is not the case’. The Tribunal ‘should at least give the sovereign, 
non-commercial acts of Kazakhstan the deference that comity requires’.166 The claimant was 
                                                
161 Ibid. para.84. 
162 Ibid. 
163 ICSID, Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine – Award, 26 July 2007, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award. 
164 Ibid. para.124. 
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lucky enough that comity was such an ambiguous concept, shrouded in misunderstandings, 
rarely if ever seriously examined – a situation explained, as we may recall from the introduction 
to this article, by lawyers’ generally dismissive attitude for the concept. Hence the claimant 
could safely argue that comity was a public international law concept referring to ‘non-binding 
rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill observed by sovereign states in their mutual 
dealings’. A tribunal not being a sovereignty state, it followed that the reference to comity was 
misplaced.167 The Tribunal tagged along, holding that the concept of comity had no 
applicability in arbitration. Further, it stated that it had not been shown that ‘such a legal 
principle is part of any known laws or rules concerning international commercial arbitration, 
including Swedish or Kazakh arbitration law’. It thus concluded that there was no legal basis 
for it to abstain from reviewing the acts of the respondent solely because it was a sovereign 
state and that comity was not, under the arbitration clause, a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction.168 
While less straightforward, the reference to comity in the Second Procedural Order in 
ADF can also be included under this heading. In the decision, concerning the place of 
arbitration, the Tribunal relayed the United States argument voicing its commitment to 
facilitating international arbitration, and considered the approach of the United States Supreme 
Court on the matter.169 In particular, the Tribunal relied the deferential approach epitomised in 
Mitsubishi v Soler, which we discussed supra, 1.B.3. 
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168 Ibid. 139.  
169 ADF Group v United States, supra n41. 
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A comity argument was again raised by the respondent state in Railroad Development 
Corporation.170 The case was about Guatemala’s use of a legal process known as lesividad or 
lesivo, which serves to declare an activity harmful to the interests of the state. Guatemala 
maintained that this process was not in itself contrary to the minimum standard of treatment. 
Finding otherwise, Guatemala argued, would in effect ‘undermine the requirement that fair and 
equitable treatment be determined by a case-specific, fact-based inquiry, and would violate 
notions of comity and sovereignty’.171 The investment arbitral tribunal dodged the issue of 
comity and merely found that the procedure had been abused.172 
A similar argument was raised by one of the parties in Hesham T. M. Al Warraq.173 
Appearing as the Respondent, Indonesia argued that the Claimant’s accusation that the 
decisions of the domestic courts had been ‘unfair and unjust’ amounted to ‘a grave charge 
against the independent judiciary of one of the world's largest democracies’.174 Accordingly, 
‘the principle of comity alone’ required the Tribunal to act on the presumption that the 
Indonesian Court had acted properly.175 
More recently, comity arguments were also considered by a PCA tribunal in Chevron 
and Texaco v. Ecuador. In the first case, party reference. The decision on Track 1B is 
                                                
170 ICSID Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala – Award, 29 June 2012, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/23. 
171 Ibid. 24. 
172 Ibid. 233. 
173 Hesham T. M. Al Warraq v. Republic of Indonesia – Award, 15 December 2014, UNCITRAL. 
174 Ibid. para. 405 
175 Ibid. 
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particularly interesting: the claimants had requested, among other things, a declaratory award 
stating that the Lago Agrio Judgment ‘violate[d] international public policy and natural justice, 
and that as a matter of international comity and public policy… [it] should not be recognised 
and enforced’. The Tribunal noted that ‘whilst not strictly bound to follow their result or 
reasoning as a matter of international law, this Tribunal would have wished to be guided, as 
regards any relevant issue of Ecuadorian law, by the decisions of the Lago Agrio Court, the 
Appellate Court of Lago Agrio and the Cassation Court’. Such an approach, the Tribunal was 
eager to remark, ‘would extend beyond courtesy, comity and due respect for the Respondent’s 
judicial branch’.176 Ultimately, it found that the circumstances of the case—namely the multiple 
allegations of denial of justice raised by the claimants—militated against the adoption of one 
such approach.177 
E. Comity and Precedent 
The idea that precedents – in the non-technical meaning of ‘prior cases’ – of other tribunals 
should be followed, because of comity, was entertained in the ICSID case Tulip Real Estate.178 
The parties had referred the Tribunal to prior decisions of various international judicial bodies. 
Here is what the Tribunal thought of it: ‘although not bound by such citations… as a matter of 
                                                
176 PCA, Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Corporation (USA.) v. Republic of Ecuador [II], 
Decision on Track 1B, 12 March 2015, PCA Case No 2009-23. 
177 Ibid. para. 141. 
178 ICSID, Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands BV. v. Turkey - Decision On Bifurcated 
Jurisdictional Issue, 5 March 2013, ICSID Case No ARB/11/28. 
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comity, it should have regard to earlier decisions of courts (particularly the ICJ) and of other 
international dispute tribunals engaged in the interpretation of the terms of a BIT’.179  
Interestingly, issues of hierarchy were also considered: the respondent had submitted that 
preference should be accorded to the decisions of the International Court of Justice; the claimant 
maintained that those of ICSID tribunals were more relevant.180 The Tribunal concluded that 
both sources could inform its interpretation of the terms of the BIT according to their rigour 
and persuasiveness.181 
F. Comity as Neighbourliness, Cooperation and Respect for Other 
Sovereign Entities  
In other cases, the term comity comes up as a catchall expression covering neighborliness and 
respect for the sovereign prerogatives of other states.  
In Passage Through the Great Belt comity is mentioned, in passing, in the separate 
opinion of Judge Broms, where the argument is made that the dispute at issue could be resolved 
by the use of negotiations ‘in the best Nordic spirit of comity and co-operation’.182 Nordic spirits 
notwithstanding, it is hard to ascribe any certain meaning, beyond the general idea of co-
operation, to this invocation of comity.  
                                                
179 Ibid. para.45. 
180 Ibid. para.46. 
181 Ibid. para.47. 
182 Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures, 1991 ICJ REP. 12, 37 (Jul. 29) 
(separate opinion of Judge Broms). 
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The European Court of Human Rights has in turn invoked the concept several times 
with reference to the question of the grant of sovereign immunities in civil proceedings. The 
Court has addressed the issue several times to assess whether such a grant of immunity could 
unduly limit one’s right of access to a court.183 Under the European Convention of Human 
Rights, limitations to rights such as the one of access to a court must, among other things, pursue 
a legitimate aim. Starting in 2001, the Court has consistently argued that the grant of sovereign 
immunity does just that.184 It ‘is a concept of international law, developed out of the principle 
par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State shall not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of another State’.185 Its grant thus ‘pursues the legitimate aim of complying with 
international law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of 
another State’s sovereignty’.186  
The concept was also invoked in an unclear fashion in Certain Questions of Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters.187 The issue of comity was raised in an argument by Djibouti 
                                                
183 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 
5, 213 UNTS 221, Article 6 (henceforth ‘the Convention’). 
184 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001) para. 54; McElhinney v. Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2001) para. 35; Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001) para. 34; Cudak v. Lithuania, App. 
No. 15869/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 23, 2010) para. 60; Sabeh el Leil v. France, App. No. 34869/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Jun. 29, 2011) para. 52; Oleynikov v. Russia, App. No. 36703/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 3, 2013) paras. 60-64; 
Wallishauser v. Austria, App. No. 156/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jul. 17, 2012) paras. 53-60; Jones and Others v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 34356/06 and 40528/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 14, 2014) paras. 184, 188, 196. 
185 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001) para. 54.  
186 Ibid. 
187 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France) 2008 ICJ REP. 177 (Jun. 4). 
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about a witness summons issued under French law to the Djiboutian head of state.188 Djibouti 
contended that France would have been required to take preventive measures to protect the 
immunity and dignity of a head of state on its territory on an official visit (as per Article 29 of 
the VCDR). France was thus responsible for ‘internationally wrongful acts consisting of 
infringements of the principles of international comity and of the customary and conventional 
rules relating to immunities’.189 The Court ultimately found that the defects in the summons 
were not unambiguously attributable to France and eluded the interpretation of the term 
‘comity’.190  
More recently, mentions of the principle in the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights have arguably leaned towards more qualified forms of neighborliness: for 
example, in a recent case one judge has emphasized the role of the Court in ensuring the uniform 
application of the 1980 Hague Convention on Child Abduction furthers comity among States.191 
In yet another case it was argued that ‘reasons of international comity and practicality’ could 
have called for an effort by a state party to the Convention, which had become a source of 
migrants, to assist other states in the implementation of their immigration rules and policies.192 
It is arguable that the term was employed to the same ends by the European Commission 
in one of the Kadi cases. The Court of First Instance relayed the Commission’s argument that 
                                                
188 Ibid. para.162. 
  Ibid. para.165. 
190 Ibid. paras 172-175. 
191 X v. Latvia, App. No. 27853/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 26, 2013), concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque. 
192 Stamose v. Bulgaria, App. No. 29713/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov 11, 2012) para. 36. 
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‘the principle of comity of nations obliges the Community to implement those measures (UNSC 
sanctions) inasmuch as they are designed to protect all States against terrorist attacks’, but did 
not discuss the remarkable claim.193   
The European Court of Justice has later used the term in a different way in the context 
of a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of a directive on the 
protection of workers.194 The case concerned the closure of a United States military base in the 
United Kingdom: the United States argued that the application of the directive concerned to 
such a strategic decision would have been incompatible with ‘principles of public international 
law, in particular the principle of jus imperii and that of the ‘comity of nations’’.195 The Court, 
however, did not pronounce on the issue as it found that it did not have jurisdiction, as the 
situation did not fall within the scope of the directive.196  
Conclusion 
This study has sought to clarify the importance, current and potential, of the use of comity by 
international courts and tribunals. Our findings support the idea that comity might be an 
emerging principle of procedural law, though agreement on its exact meaning—or unequivocal 
choices among its many connotations—still tend to be uncommon. We submit that, as long as 
other solutions are not in place, the principle can be successfully employed to assist 
                                                
193  Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission ECR 2005 II-3649, para. 163. 
194Case C‑583/10, Nolan (Court of Justice, Third Chamber, October 18, 2012). Available at http://curia.europa.eu. 
195 Ibid., paras. 24-25. 
196 Ibid., paras. 32-57. 
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international courts and tribunals in mediating jurisdictional conflicts between themselves, 
balancing coordination efforts and the demands of justice in the individual cases. 
 Comity may serve as a meta-principle of coordination between international judicial 
bodies, to be employed in the pursuit of the common interest to an efficient and fair system of 
international dispute settlement. There are strong reasons militating in favour of this 
proposition: international tribunals, by and large, possess the powers necessary to exercise it; 
international judges and arbitrators know how to use it; and its long history of applications at 
the domestic level suggests that it can be employed successfully for a variety of purposes.  
We also submit the hunch that comity may most likely be employed as a central 
principle for further aspects of the coordination of international adjudication, for instance 
informing the sound use of analogical reasoning and precedent-borrowing process. Further 
study will be required to assess the potential of comity in this context. We have, so far, restricted 
ourselves to a simpler and more crucial task, seeking to resituate the principle of comity as one 
on which to rely for the resolution of different types of conflicts between international 
jurisdictions, and to question the traditional assumption that it is just an unhelpful complication: 
its history and rediscovery suggest otherwise. 
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